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Introduction
There was a point in the data file when the numbers just ended. That was the point when
the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia had broken up during its fiery re-entry, severing its telemetry
with ground controllers. A sense of sadness and resolve overwhelmed me at that moment in a
conference room of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Michoud
Assembly Facility, where I had traveled to serve as a team member for the Columbia accident
investigation. The Apollo I fire was a sad event in history that I could not remember. The
Challenger accident shocked me as a young mechanical engineering student, who dreamed of
working for NASA and couldn’t believe that the Shuttle had exploded. The Columbia accident, I
took personally, having supported the Space Shuttle Program at NASA for over ten years. Each
year, at the end of January, NASA pauses on one day to remember the seventeen lives lost in the
Apollo I, Challenger, and Columbia accidents. Observing a day of remembrance is not enough
to honor their legacy. It is vital that NASA and its contractors, including me, assume the
responsibility to understand the root causes of these accidents and lessons learned, in order avoid
repeating the mistakes of the past.
It is easy to look at U.S. space program accidents merely from the hardware failure
perspective.

Conventional lessons learned wisdom says that if one understands the root causes

a hardware failure, one can take steps to prevent that type of failure again. The three missions to
be investigated in this work are the Apollo Saturn 204 (AS-204), Plugs Out Test fire in 1967, the
Challenger explosion during ascent in 1986, and the Columbia destruction during re-entry in
2003. All three accidents were a result of hardware failures, but the hardware failed for different
reasons and during different mission phases. Charles Perrow states that due to its complexity,
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the space business retains a “residual propensity for system accidents”.1 To accomplish a
complex mission in harsh, unforgiving environments, space vehicles will always be complex.
Because of this complexity, it is beneficial to track hardware failure lessons learned and NASA
has put a significant amount of effort into capturing and documenting these lessons. However,
there are also human factors leading to the accidents in addition to the hardware failures
themselves.
This paper will investigate some non-hardware factors that contributed to these accidents.
While investigating these factors, some fundamental questions will be explored. Were there any
warning signs before the accidents? What was the impact of poor decision making? Did
something as simple as poor communication contribute to these accidents? The history of space
accidents can be examined in order to identify human behaviors/errors that lead to these
accidents and to formulate actionable strategies that could prevent future accidents. Despite
three different examples of significant hardware failures, all three U.S. space accidents can be
traced back to poor decision making, which can be the result of multiple factors. Thus, there
were multiple technical and non-technical factors that led to the three U.S. space accidents. This
work will show that there were three key factors, cognitive bias, normalization of deviance, and
most of all, communication breakdown, that led to poor decision making which was a significant
contribution to the three U.S. space accidents. This paper will explore and evaluate each
accident for the presence of the above factors.
The primary sources for this work focus on the documentation, interviews, and
Congressional testimonies surrounding the investigation of the three accidents. One source is the

1

Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999), 258.
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Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, which documented the investigation following the AS-204 fire. For the most
part, it focused on the technical causes of the fire, mainly highly combustible materials in a
capsule pressurized with pure oxygen.2 Even though it does not cover non-technical factors in
detail compared to sources on Challenger and Columbia, some may be inferred. Another source
is the Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, also
known informally as the Rogers Commission Report. In addition to a thorough discussion of the
Solid Rocket Motor O-ring failure that led to the accident, it also discusses the acceptance of
chronic O-ring erosion over the life of the Shuttle beginning with the second mission, STS-2.3 It
also discusses the multiple communication issues present on the day before and the day of
launch.4 The source documenting the Columbia accident is the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board Report, also known as the CAIB Report. In addition to the documentation of both the
External Tank foam strikes on the Columbia Orbiter during ascent, it explains in forensic detail
the disintegration of the vehicle during re-entry. It also goes into much greater detail than the
investigation reports of the other two accidents with respect to the non-technical causes of the
accident. Again, NASA was shown as accepting anomalous behavior, foam liberating from the
External Tank and striking the Orbiter, as normal.5 It also provides detail on numerous instances
of communication breakdown including multiple missed opportunities to discover the damage to

2
Report of the Apollo 204 Review Board to the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), 5.9 – 5.11.
3
Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1986), 65.
4

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 83.
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Columbia Accident Investigation Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003), 130.
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Columbia and attempt a repair.6 Additional primary sources were consulted, but the
investigation reports for each of the three accidents show a pattern of issues with decision
making and communication.
Many secondary sources have attempted to explain why the accidents happened, both
from a technical and a non-technical perspective. One source, Charles Perrow’s Normal
Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, explores failures in various industries and
attempts to explain why they occur. Perrow points out that systems that are very complex, with
multiple interactions between the sub-systems, will inevitably lead to failure.7 His conclusion is
sobering, given that most space vehicles, particularly human-rated vehicles, are extremely
complex. Diane Vaughan, in her book The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology,
Culture, and Deviance at NASA, emphasizes what she terms “Normalization of Deviance”,
which is a tendency to accept hardware anomalies over time such that they become a new
“normal” condition.8 Although her book focuses on the Challenger accident, this phenomenon
was observed on both the Challenger and Columbia accidents. She contended that there was no
evidence of NASA breaking rules or willful misconduct, but that there were issues with the
NASA organization and culture which led to the acceptance too much risk.9 One significant
contribution that Vaughan’s work made was that it impacted how NASA conducted the
Columbia investigation, shifting the main emphasis on the technical causes to equal emphasis on
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Columbia Accident Investigation Report, 140-166.
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Perrow, Normal Accidents, 93-94.
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Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 136-143.
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Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 56-58.
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the technical and non-technical causes.10 In fact, the chairman of the CAIB had read her book,
and was already making note of parallels between the Challenger and Columbia accidents before
the Board began its investigation.11 Vaughan would eventually join the CAIB, writing a chapter
of the report, “History as Cause: Columbia and Challenger.”12 Charles Perrow did not
completely agree with Vaughan’s interpretation of the Challenger accident causes. He asserted
that management made poor decisions based on schedule/production pressure and used their
power/influence to suppress the opinions of engineers in their organizations.13 This certainly
challenges Vaughan’s assertion that there was no willful misconduct. However, Perrow did state
that he saw no “criminal activity” when comparing the space industry to others.14 Stephen
Waring, in his chapter “Losing the Shuttle (or nearly): Accidents and Anomalies,” from the
book Space Shuttle Legacy: How We Did It and What We Learned, presents a balanced account
that discusses both the technical and non-technical causes of the Shuttle accidents. He asserted
that too much emphasis has been put on a “flawed NASA technical culture” and instead focused
on flawed decision making and communication breakdown that led to both Shuttle accidents.15
All three accounts agree that issues with the complex hardware led to the accidents, but that
equally important, issues such as flawed decision making, acceptance of poorly performing
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Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, xix.
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Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, xx.
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Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, xxi.
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Perrow, Normal Accidents, 379-380.
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Perrow, Normal Accidents, 258.

Stephen Waring, “Losing the Shuttle (or Nearly): Accidents and Anomalies,” Space Shuttle Legacy:
How We Did It and What We Learned, eds. Roger Launius, John Krige, and James Craig (Washington: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astrodynamics, 2013), 215.
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hardware, and the breakdown of communication were significant factors that drove these
accidents.
Definition of Terms
Decision makers in organizations such as NASA must have the best possible information
in order to make an informed decision. Even when they have high quality data available to them,
decision makers can be subject to cognitive biases which affect how they view the information
placed before them. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky conceptualized
cognitive bias in the 1970s.16 According to them, cognitive bias is a method for a person to use
“judgmental heuristics” to understand a situation in which there is considerable uncertainty.17 In
other words, the human brain uses methods to simplify a complicated or uncertain situation and
make it much easier to process. Although these attempts to simplify a situation can lead to errors
in judgement, the authors maintain that they are not necessarily motivated by “wishful thinking
or the distortion of judgements by payoffs or penalties.”18 Although there are many defined
types of cognitive bias, the main sources of cognitive bias I observed in the three U.S. space
accidents were confirmation bias, anchoring bias, and near-miss bias. For each accident, this
work will discuss how one or more cognitive biases impacted decision makers.
Confirmation bias is the tendency for a decision maker to accept only information or data
that is consistent with his/her current belief about a situation. Data that does not support that
position is either ignored or dismissed. Kahneman describes this thought process as “a deliberate

16
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, “Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases,” Science 185, Number 4157, (Sep. 27, 1974), 1124.
17

Kahneman, et al, “Judgement Under Uncertainty,” 1124.
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Kahneman, et al, “Judgement Under Uncertainty,” 1130.

7
search for confirming evidence” instead of testing a belief by trying to find contradictory
evidence.19

Anchoring bias is the tendency for a decision maker to start at some initial estimate

and then update it, but often these “updates” are insufficient.20 In other words, a decision maker
with anchoring bias puts significant value on the first information received, which is perceived as
the most important. This creates a challenge when additional data is introduced. It seems to me
that anchoring bias can set up a position by the decision maker that can make him/her susceptible
to confirmation bias when additional information is introduced.
The most common cognitive bias observed in the three U.S. space accidents was nearmiss bias. A near-miss is a successful event that avoided a negative outcome, often due to “good
luck.”21 According to Robin Dillon, Edward Rogers, and Catherine Tinsley, decision makers
who survived a near-miss “made significantly more risky decisions in the future.”22 Thus, nearmiss bias is often a negative by-product of previous success. It appears in engineering when
hardware with a known design flaw operates successfully, and this success breeds the belief that
the design flaw is acceptable and will not fail in the future. Near-miss bias is strengthened with
each successful test or flight. This bias seems to lead to the phenomenon “normalization of
deviance” described by Vaughan. Unfortunately, based on my experience, NASA budgets and
schedules have never been robust enough to afford the number of tests/flights that would enable
engineers to make a sound conclusion that the hardware is completely safe to fly. If the
hardware is a complicated space vehicle, it is unlikely that the engineering team will fully

19

Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 81.
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Kahneman, et al, “Judgement Under Uncertainty,” 1128.

Robin Dillon, Edward Rogers and Catherine Tinsley, “The Near-Miss Bias in Decision Making,”
IEEEAC, Paper Number 1201 (October 25, 2005), 2.
21
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Dillon, et al, “The Near-Miss Bias in Decision Making,” 2.
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understand it.23 If the team does not understand all of the potential sources of risk, then it may
conclude after a few successful tests or flights that the hardware, even though it does not meet
requirements, is still good to fly. One point of significant concern expressed by Dillon, et al, was
that decision makers who have what is perceived as success, even if due to a near-miss, are more
likely to be promoted.24 Thus near-miss bias can become “institutionalized […] within an
organization.”25
Another source of poor decision making, and closely related to the near-miss bias, is
normalization of deviance. Normalization of deviance goes beyond near-miss bias and causes
decision makers to accept design and performance issues as “normal”.26 There is a gradual shift
from labeling hardware anomalies to accepting poor hardware performance as expected and
acceptable. Hardware performance is monitored, and each occurrence of a potential issue is
compared to an “experience base” and labeled as “in family” or “not in family”.27 Often, with
normalization of deviance, the “experience base” can shift to accommodate observations “not in
family”.28 Thus what is “normal” gradually shifts with time, often to a new normal that has
increased risk.
For each of the three accidents, this work will discuss issues with communication. A
decision maker cannot choose the right path to take if he/she does not receive all of the relevant

23

Perrow, 257.
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Dillon, et al, “The Near-Miss Bias in Decision Making,” 2.
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26
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facts. All three accidents can be traced back to issues with communication. These issues fell
roughly into two categories: 1. Engineering concerns not reaching decision makers, and 2. Data
presented in a way that is not clear. There were multiple sources of poor or missed
communication. Examples were advance warnings from the hardware performance and
engineers, silencing of dissenting technical opinions, engineering concerns not reaching the
decision makers due to broken or complicated communication channels, mistaken assumption
that communication was heard and understood, and the presentation of data to decision makers
that was unclear or confusing. Unfortunately, each accident had multiple communications
failures.
The AS-204 Plugs Out Test (Apollo I) Fire
In order to understand the details of the non-technical factors that caused the three
accidents, it is necessary to review a brief history of each accident. The AS-204 (retroactively
named Apollo I) Plugs Out Test fire occurred on January 27, 1967 on Launch Pad 34 at Cape
Canaveral.29 The astronauts reported a fire in the Command Module (CM), which lasted less
than twenty-six seconds.30 The fire produced extremely high temperatures and toxic gases as
well as consumed the oxygen in the capsule.31 It is likely that the astronauts were rendered
unconscious by the toxic fumes and then died of asphyxiation.32 Even if the astronauts had
remained conscious, the hatch design was such that it could not be opened in less than ninety

29
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, AS204 Accident, 90th Cong., 2nd
sess, S. Rep. 956, 1968, 1.
30

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 1.

31

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 5.

32

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 5.
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seconds and the inward opening design would have made it impossible to open given the high
pressure inside the cabin.33 The exact ignition source of the fire was never determined, but it
was believed to have been an electrical arc in the wiring near the floor under the crew seats.34
Confirmation bias was observed in the events leading up to the Apollo I fire. An
example of confirmation bias associated with the AS-204/Apollo I fire was the decision to use
highly flammable pure oxygen instead of a much less flammable dual gas air system (oxygen
and nitrogen in proportions like air) in the CM for life support.35 This was a risky design choice
since nearly anything, even metal, will burn rapidly in a pure oxygen environment. NASA
engineers knew that a pure oxygen environment was hazardous. The agency had funded studies
to understand the behavior of fire in a pure oxygen environment.36 In fact, at least two fires had
occurred during the test program, injuring personnel and damaging equipment.37 The fires were
ultimately attributed to test equipment and not to the hazard of using pure oxygen.38 The
decision makers focused on the successes of the Mercury and Gemini programs, which used pure
oxygen, and completely discounted the fires seen during NASA testing.39 Thus the decision

33

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.

34

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 5.

35

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Hearing Before the Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on a Review Background Information and Systems Decisions Preceding the
Apollo Accident of January 27, 1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), 23.
36

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.

37

U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing Apollo Accident of January 27, 1967, 32.

38

U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing Apollo Accident of January 27, 1967, 33.

39

U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing Apollo Accident of January 27, 1967, 32.
U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.
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makers were accepting the data that confirmed their design decision and discounted the already
known danger of using pure oxygen including the fires that occurred during testing.
Near-miss bias was also a factor in the Apollo I fire. It has been discussed the Apollo
program came on the heels of the highly successful Mercury and Gemini programs.40 The
Mercury and Gemini capsules were also pressurized with pure oxygen.41 The dual gas system
was considered for the Apollo CM atmosphere but was ultimately rejected due to the risk of
astronauts getting the bends as well as the added complexity and weight.42 James Chiles also
pointed out that during this time, the Apollo team was likely distracted by two near-misses.43
The first near-miss occurred during a test of a potential dual gas Project Mercury life support
system when a test pilot was almost asphyxiated as nitrogen leaked into the oxygen supply of the
his spacesuit.44 The second near-miss was the hatch that blew off prematurely after splashdown
of Gus Grissom’s Mercury capsule, which likely led to the complex, difficult to open, Apollo
hatch.45 Since there had been no mishaps with the pure oxygen atmosphere during the Mercury
and Gemini Programs, it was assumed that using a pure oxygen was safe to fly in the Apollo
CM.46 Alan Shepard and Deke Slayton asserted that because pure oxygen had been used in the

40

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.

41

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.

42

U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing Apollo Accident of January 27, 1967, 16.

Alan Shepard and Deke Slayton, Moon Shot: The Inside Story of America’s Race to the Moon (Atlanta:
Turner Publishing, 1994), 197.
43
James R. Chiles, Inviting Disaster: Lessons from the Edge of Technology (New York: Harper Collins,
2001), 145.
44

Chiles, Inviting Disaster, 145.
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Chiles, Inviting Disaster, 146.

46

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 3.
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capsule without any problems, “NASA engineers had become complacent about the possibility
of a fire.”47
The Apollo I fire occurred almost thirty years before Diane Vaughan coined the term
normalization of deviance. However, one can look at the events leading to the fire in order to
determine if this accident was another example of normalization of deviance. As discussed
earlier, normalization of deviance involves the acceptance of design/hardware issues as normal
to the point that there is a shift to a new, more risky, normal.48 One could view the risky
acceptance of a pure oxygen atmosphere as normalization of deviance. However, this
atmosphere had been used since the beginning of U.S. human spaceflight and thus there was no
real shift in what was considered normal. However, there could be one additional aspect of the
Apollo I fire that was an example of normalization of deviance. There were significant hardware
issues with the CM such as various component workmanship issues and failures as well as
“deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, rework and quality control” of the electrical
wiring.49 The CM had been described as “sloppy and unsafe” by an Apollo quality control
inspector and was reported to have had extensive failures during fabrication and assembly.50 It
appears that NASA was shifting to a “normal” of accepting hardware with multiple issues.
Another finding even more surprising to me was that there was originally supposed to be an uncrewed pure oxygen pressurization test of the CM prior to the Plugs Out Test.51 This test, which

47

Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 200.

48

Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, xii.

49

U.S. Congress, Senate, AS204 Accident, 6-3.

50

Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 199.

51

Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 194.
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had once been considered “essential”, was skipped due to schedule pressure.52 This shift away
from un-crewed testing a piece of critical human-rated hardware could be another indication of
normalization of deviance at work in the Apollo Program. This was particularly surprising to me
given that Apollo’s budget was significantly more generous than that of the Shuttle
Transportation System. However, regardless of the available funding, schedule pressure was still
present given President Kennedy’s goal of reaching the Moon within the decade.
Most people in the space business believe that the likelihood of an accident is greater in
flight. Perhaps that could account for the shock when the fire engulfed the Apollo I capsule
during the Plugs Out test at Pad 34. The purpose of the Plugs Out Test was a “dress rehearsal”
to simulate pre-launch and launch conditions.53 The most obvious communication failure
happened on the day of the test. The words of Walter Schirra to mission Commander Virgil
“Gus” Grissom, before entering the CM were almost prophetic: “It’ll take you a minimum of
ninety seconds to get all those hatches open (so) if you have a problem, even a communications
problem, get out of the cabin until the problem is cleared up.”54 The test experienced multiple
issues with communications between the crew and the ground controllers.55 The audio of the test
was muffled, garbled and at times had a great deal of static/white noise.56 In fact, Grissom
quipped “How are we gonna get to the Moon if we can’t talk between three buildings,” and
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Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 194.
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Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 194-195.

54

Shepard and Slayton, Moon Shot, 196.
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Senior Pilot Ed White replied “They can’t hear a thing you’re saying.”57 The AS-204
investigation concluded that the communications system was “marginal” for normal operations
and inadequate for emergencies.58 Poor communication likely slowed down the process of
identifying that a fire was taking place as well as slowed down the response to the fire. After the
fire starts, White shouts frantically, “Hey! We’ve got a fire in the cockpit” and Pilot Roger
Chaffe screams “We have a bad fire…we’re burning up,” yet there was no response from ground
controllers until roughly twenty seconds later when they attempted to re-establish
communications with the crew.59 All that is heard after that point is the Test Conductor
instructing pad personnel to get the crew out.60 The test should have been halted when it was
discovered that there were inadequate communications between the crew and the controllers, so
why wasn’t it stopped?
In the Preface of the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space
Sciences concerning the AS-204 fire, there is a statement that “no single person bears all of the
responsibility for the Apollo 204 accident […]” and that it occurred “[…] because many people
made the mistake of failing to recognize a hazardous condition.”61 The AS-204 accident
investigation board had concluded that the personnel responsible for the test did not identify it as
hazardous.62 We discussed earlier that the successes of Mercury and Gemini and the resulting
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near-miss bias may have had an impact on the decision to use pure oxygen in the CM.63 This
bias may have also played a role in the decision to not classify the test as hazardous. This
decision had significant implications with respect to communication.
Lack of communication that this was a hazardous operation had a cascade effect,
eliminating many potential crew safety/escape options. Despite the pure oxygen environment of
the ground test, many highly combustible materials were placed in the capsule for the test.64 The
“time critical” procedure for the crew to egress from the CM required seven non-trivial steps to
complete before they could exit.65 The accident investigation revealed that the crew did not
accomplish much, possibly any, of these steps before they lost consciousness.66 There were no
procedures to rapidly depress the cabin and remove the complex three-part hatch either from the
inside or outside and personnel had not been trained to remove the hatch during an emergency.67
There was no fire extinguishing equipment on board and no instruments to directly warn them or
the ground controllers of an ignition.68 The Firex system on the pad used for fire suppression
could not be activated remotely from the control room and one of the two systems for activating
it on the pad was not functioning.69 Thick smoke in the white room adjacent to the CM impeded
the rescue and there was no system for venting the smoke.70 There were no medical or fire
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personnel stationed on site during the test.71 The crew egress path from the pad was
complicated and filled with hazards.72 Crew egress training was not adequate and the first
realistic egress exercise was planned to take place after the Plugs Out test.73 Ultimately, the
decision not to classify the test as hazardous, communicated to the test team that the test was
safe and that precautions mentioned above did not need to be taken.
Why did no one deem this to be a hazardous operation? Using pure oxygen was enough
of a concern that NASA attempted to eliminate all ignition sources in the CM and testing was
conducted on the flammability of materials in pure oxygen.74 My initial thought was that
schedule pressure must have been a factor, given everything that would have needed to be
corrected if the test had been labeled hazardous. However, in the hearings before the Senate,
James J. Gehrig the Committee Staff Director asked Dr. Charles Berry, NASA Chief of the
Manned Spacecraft Center Medical Programs, if the Apollo schedule had an impact on the
decision to use pure oxygen instead of a dual gas system in the CM.75 Dr. Berry said that the
decision was made based on “our experience from other programs and it was not related to any
expediency whatever.”76 It is difficult to determine if this statement can be taken at face value,
or was the result of a witness sticking with “the party line.” The AS-204 accident investigation
board offers another potential explanation for why the test was not deemed a hazardous
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operation. One of their findings was that the “criteria for defining hazardous test operations”
were not complete.”77 They also concluded that the requirements that were needed to review and
approve spacecraft test procedures were “not well defined.”78 Here we find a source of poor
written communication in vital requirements that are supposed to help engineers determine if an
operation or test is hazardous.
It is clear that there were multiple communications issues associated with the AS204/Apollo I fire. The communications during the test, vital to its success and the safety of the
crew were poor and likely impacted the response to the fire. Although using pure oxygen is
inherently dangerous, the decision by NASA to not classify the test as hazardous resulted in the
use of combustible materials in the CM, inadequate training, no emergency personnel stationed
at the pad, a hazardous egress path from the pad, and a test crew that did not discontinue the test
due to poor communication quality. The written requirements for defining a hazardous test and
for approving test procedures were not well defined and incomplete. Thus, poor written
communication ultimately prevented test personnel from implementing the proper safety
procedures appropriate for a hazardous operation. It is possible that better communication might
have prevented the Apollo I fire, but better communication would not have changed two
technical factors, a complex hatch design and a high-pressure pure oxygen environment. We are
left to wonder if the un-crewed test that was skipped would have resulted in a fire, which would
have damaged the CM, but spared the lives of the Apollo I crew.
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The Challenger STS-51-L Accident
The Space Shuttle Challenger, STS 51-L, exploded seventy-three seconds after liftoff on
January 28, 1986.79 During ascent, the right-hand Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) aft field joint
began to leak hot combustion gas from inside the booster.80 The flame from the leak was
directed onto both the External Tank (ET) and the aft strut connecting the booster to the ET.81
The jet of hot combustion products from the booster burned through the wall of the liquid
hydrogen tank, releasing highly explosive hydrogen fuel.82 Around the same time, the aft strut
connecting the booster to the ET failed, allowing the booster to rotate at the forward attach
point.83 The aft end of the ET hydrogen tank failed and the rotating Booster struck the Intertank
and the aft end of the liquid oxygen tank.84 The release and ignition of the ET fuel and oxidizer
resulted in a catastrophic explosion, breaking the ET and the Orbiter Challenger apart.85 The
Roger’s Commission concluded that the failure of the right booster aft joint was due to a poor
design that was “sensitive to a number of factors.”86
The main source of cognitive bias associated with the Challenger accident was near-miss
bias. The SRB field joint design was considered flawed from the beginning, yet there was no
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effort to redesign it.87 The SRB contractor, Thiokol maintained that the design was acceptable as
it was similar to their reliable Titan III rocket motor designed for the Air Force, although there
were enough design differences to make that comparison invalid.88 Damage to the O-rings used
to seal the joint had been observed in post-flight inspections since the second Shuttle mission.89
Instead of launching an effort to redesign the field joint, NASA and the SRB contractor Thiokol
deemed the damage acceptable since it had not caused a failure of the SRB.90 It is also possible
that problems with the SRB nozzle to case joint, which was considered a greater concern,
distracted Thiokol from the dangers of the field joint.91 Thus NASA continued to fly the Shuttle
with a known hardware problem, thinking that since it hadn’t caused a major mishap, it would
likely not pose an issue for future flights.
The Challenger accident essentially gave birth to the concept of normalization of
deviance, when Diane Vaughan used it to describe NASA’s decision to continue flying an SRB
field joint that was susceptible to O-ring damage. As early as in the design and development
phase, NASA MSFC engineers expressed concerns with the SRB field joint design, yet they
were not addressed.92 Then damage to the field joint O-rings was observed almost from the
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beginning yet they didn’t stop to redesign the joint.93 Thiokol offered rationale that there were
two O-rings providing redundancy such that if the first O-ring failed, the second would hold.94
The criticality rating of the SRB field joint had been Criticality 1R, which meant it could fail, but
remain safe due to redundancy provided by the second O-Ring.95 The criticality rating would
eventually be changed to Criticality 1, indicating that some at NASA did not think that there was
true redundancy in the field joint.96 However, the launch constraint and thus the increased
hardware scrutiny that the Criticality 1 rating required, was regularly waived by the SRB Project
Manager.97 Vaughan asserts that NASA was following the rules when processing these
waivers.98 I would agree, from a legalistic standpoint, NASA was following the rules, but the
waivers seem to me to have been processed out of expedience. Over time, NASA and Thiokol
increased the amount of O-ring damage that they would deem “acceptable.”99 One of the
surprising examples was the mission STS 51-C about a year before the Challenger accident,
which launched after three days with a record low temperature.100 Alan McDonald recalled that
it was clear to them that the cold temperatures had made the O-rings less compliant.101 When
inspection of the O-rings after recovery revealed erosion on both, which was the first occurrence
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of erosion on both seals, the explanation at the FRR for the following launch was that the cold
weather affected the O-rings.102 In addition, the condition was deemed “not desirable but
acceptable.”103 NASA crossed over from near-miss bias to normalization of deviance when they
chose to accept an inadequate design and shifted with respect to what performance from that
design was acceptable. Diane Vaughan described what she saw as a repeated sequence of events
where the Shuttle program identified an issue, acknowledged the risk, reviewed the data,
accepted the risk “indicating the normalization of deviance”, and then launched.104 She
attributed the normalization of deviance to a “work group culture” that was formed to respond to
the O-ring issue and would dictate decision making for each occurrence of the anomaly.105 This
culture established and rigorously followed the “rules” that it made.106
Although near-miss bias and normalization of deviance caused NASA to continue to use
the poor design of the SRB field joint, there were some significant communications issues
associated with the Challenger accident. The Roger’s Commission Report of the investigation
made it clear that there were significant communications issues impacting decision making
including “the decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes missing information,
a conflict between engineering data and management judgements, and a NASA management
structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.”107
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However, the communications issues began long before the STS 51-L accident. Early in the
Shuttle development, Marshall Space Flight Center solid rocket propulsion engineers pointed out
issues with the joint design in at least two official memos, but the Rogers Commission could find
no evidence that these memos were received by Thiokol.108 Hence, Shuttle was plagued with
communications issues almost from the beginning. O-ring erosion was observed as early as the
second Shuttle mission, STS-2.109 The primary vehicle for communicating hardware issues that
might impact the next mission was the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) where readiness to
launch the next Shuttle is reviewed and approved by multiple levels of Shuttle management.110
Despite the significance of this finding, the STS-2 O-ring erosion was not reported in the FRR
for the next flight, STS-3.111 The issue was not covered in an FRR until the one for STS 41-C,
about three years later!112 Even at that FRR, MSFC officials deemed the erosion “acceptable.”113
The Rogers Commission concluded that NASA and Thiokol engineers “did not fully understand
the mechanism by which the joint sealing action took place.”114 There was no mention of the Oring concern in the STS 51-L FRR.115 The Rogers Commission also concluded that NASA’s
method of tracking hardware issues and reporting them through the FRR was a failure. 116 Near-
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miss bias and normalization of deviance certainly were significant factors in the acceptance of a
bad joint design and O-ring erosion, but poor communication made the problem worse.
The most well-known examples of communications failures from the Challenger accident
center on some meetings that occurred the night before the launch. The following events have
been documented many times, including depiction in at least two motion pictures. Although the
events were critical in the decision to launch Challenger, there were the tip of the iceberg with
respect to the communications issues surrounding the Shuttle program. On the day before
launch, in the afternoon, engineers at Thiokol were concerned about the temperature forecast for
launch day since it was much colder than their experience base and well below the temperature at
which the joints were qualified for flight117 Specifically, they were concerned that the O-ring in
the SRB field joints would lose flexibility in the cold temperatures, in a similar manner that a
piece of chewing gum becomes difficult to chew after placing it in ice water.118 Space hardware
is qualified for a very specific range of environments throughout its life. There is an unwritten
rule in the agency that hardware should not be operated outside of its qualification limits unless
there are special circumstances, and only if it can be proven that the hardware will not fail when
exposed to the proposed conditions. It is important to note that Diane Vaughan, concluded that
no flight rules were violated with the decision to launch Challenger.119 Technically, she is
correct, but the unwritten rule about operating hardware outside of its qualification limits was
clearly violated on launch day.
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Thiokol engineers communicated their concerns to MSFC SRB Project Management in
two separate teleconferences in the evening before the launch in a prolonged discussion that
continued late into the evening.120 During the second teleconference, it was clear that the MSFC
SRB Project Manager did not agree with the Thiokol position and was reported as saying that he
“was appalled that (Thiokol) would make such a recommendation.”121 He thought that the data
was inconsistent, showing significant O-ring damage on both warm and cold days.122 Thiokol
managers asked to pause the teleconference so they could caucus amongst themselves.123 During
that sidebar, the Thiokol Vice-President for Engineering was asked to “take off his engineering
hat and put on his management hat.”124 Feeling the pressure, Thiokol managers overrode their
engineers and said they were “go” for launch.125 Allan McDonald, a Thiokol SRB project
manager described not only production pressure at Thiokol, but also constant talk that the
government was seeking to recompete the SRB contract.126 It is possible that these pressures
motivated the Thiokol managers to reconsider their position. The concerns of the Thiokol
engineers never reached the Shuttle Mission Management Team (MMT), which was responsible
for the go/no-go decision, since MSFC project management did not communicate the Thiokol
concern to the team.127 I found no evidence that Thiokol engineers directly contacted the MMT,

120

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 86-89.

121

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 94.

122

Chiles, Inviting Disaster, 66.

123

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 94.

124

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 94.

125

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 92-94.

126

McDonald, Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, 10-11.

127

Report on the Presidential Commission of the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 87-88.

25
but it is likely they would have not strayed out of their established chain of communication. One
of the Thiokol engineers seems to confirm this when he testified to the Senate that he gave his
input and would not take away the manager’s “right to take the input of an engineer and then
make a decision based on that input […].”128 He said that he felt “badly defeated” and that he
did all he could “to stop the launch.”129 This is an example of a serious communications issue,
when people with dissenting or unpopular opinions are ignored or intentionally silenced. The
tragic result is that the top-level Shuttle Managers in MMT did not have all of the information
they needed to make a sound decision.
There was another communications breakdown during the Challenger launch decision
that was more subtle, yet has significant and sobering implications for engineers today.
According to the Rogers Commission, if NASA or Thiokol had performed a thorough analysis of
the O-Ring erosion data, the correlation between ambient temperature and launch, and O-ring
damage would have been much clearer.130 Edward Tufte, a statistician and Professor Emeritus of
Yale University conducted an evaluation of the charts that Thiokol engineers provided at the
second telecon conducted on the evening before the launch. His assessment is compelling,
stating that there was a “[…] proximal cause (of the accident): an inability to assess the link
between cool temperature and O-ring damage on earlier flights.”131 According to Tufte, the
charts had significant weaknesses including no authors on the title page, indicating lack of
responsibility for the content, too much detail in some charts, and not enough or relevant detail in
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others.132 The most compelling flaw he pointed out was the limited data set that the engineers
included regarding O-ring damage.133 The data as shown did not show a real correlation between
joint temperature and O-ring damage, and even included a data point where damage occurred on
a launch day when the temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit.134 If Thiokol had shown a plot of
the O-ring condition for all launches, it would have shown an undeniable correlation between
damage and temperature.135 A data plot including all launches would have addressed the lack of
correlation in the limited data set pointed out by MSFC SRB Project Manager. Data analysis
must be thorough and communicated in a clear way that supports an engineer’s position.
Although it is tempting to criticize the Thiokol engineers for their poor communication skills,
one consideration that must be taken into account, was the rush in the evening before the 51-L
launch, to make a launch recommendation based on the cold weather. These were the days
before Microsoft Excel and PowerPoint, when Thiokol engineers did not have the desktop
computing resources to conduct a quick data analysis and effective display. They did their best
within the time constraints given, but mistakenly assumed that the data they were showing would
be so evident that everyone would agree with them without question.136 Not only is this a
compelling example of failed written and verbal communication, it is also an example of a faulty
assumption that communication had taken place when it in fact it had not.
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Engineers at Thiokol were not the only ones who were concerned about launch that day.
Engineers at Rockwell International, the company that made the Shuttle Orbiter, were also
concerned about the cold temperatures.137 They were concerned that the outside temperature was
lower than any temperature in which they had previously launched.138 It was possible that large
amount of ice that had formed on the pad and the mobile launch platform could come loose
during the firing of the SSMEs and SRBs and be directed toward the Orbiter, causing damage to
the thermal protection tiles.139 Unlike the SRB O-ring concern, the Rockwell concern was
discussed with the Mission Management Team.140 However, Rockwell’s launch position was
very vague, and did not clearly indicate they were “no-go”.141 Furthermore, the Rogers
Commission was concerned that NASA had not “appropriately considered Rockwell’s concern
about the ice.”142 NASA had put both Thiokol and Rockwell into the awkward position of
stating that their hardware was not safe for launch.143 Once again poor, and perhaps intentionally
vague, communication from a contractor, in this case Rockwell, became a flight safety failure.
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The STS-107 Columbia Accident
The Space Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107 launched on January 16, 2003.144 About
eighty-one seconds into ascent, a piece of insulation from the ET broke off and struck the leading
edge of the Orbiter wing creating a hole.145 On February 1, 2003, the Orbiter Columbia broke up
during re-entry.146 The Orbiter thermal protection system was designed to protect it from the
superheated air that surrounds it during re-entry.147 However, the air was allowed to enter the
interior of the wing due to the hole in the leading edge.148 The hot gas melted the interior of the
wing, destroying it, and ultimately caused the break up of the entire Orbiter.149
After the STS-107 launch, the Shuttle management team was confronted with imagery that
indicated the possibility that the Orbiter wing had been struck by a piece of foam debris on
ascent. There was no clear view of the wing to determine if it had been damaged. Anchoring
bias was a significant factor that led to decision makers deciding not to pursue imagery of
Columbia’s wing after it was determined that foam had struck it.150 NASA gave preference to an
early United Space Alliance opinion that the material on the leading edge of the wing was
resilient to impact damage.151 Due to anchoring on the early United Space Alliance report,
Shuttle management team seemed almost blind to the concerns of engineers regarding potential
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damage to the orbiter.152 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board stated that this may have
“contributed to the mindset that hitting the RCC was not a concern.”153 This anchoring seemed
to set up confirmation bias observed in the events leading up to the Columbia accident, where
Shuttle decision makers might have focused on this opinion which made them less receptive to
differing opinions. Stephen Waring pointed out that the Mission Management Team considered
the foam strike as an “in family” occurrence and held the position that it was maintenance
concern, not a safety of flight issue.154 When presented the results from CRATER, the model
used to assess potential damage to Columbia’s wing, they interpreted the results as “rigorous
confirmation of their optimism.”155 Mission managers gave preference to “optimistic scenarios
and ignored pessimistic ones.”156 This confirmation bias caused mission managers to
disapprove three requests from engineers to use Department of Defense assets to get imagery of
the wing.157
Near-miss bias played a significant role in the Columbia accident. Since the first Shuttle
mission, thermal insulating foam from the ET had broken off during ascent and at times, struck
various elements of the Shuttle stack.158 This was in violation of NASA requirement that the
Shuttle “shall be designed to preclude the shedding of ice and/other debris[…]”, yet the
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requirement was never enforced.159 ET foam loss had not resulted in a significant failure of the
Shuttle, and thus it was repeatedly accepted and considered more of a turn-around/Orbiter
maintenance issue.160 Again, anomalous performance of the hardware, in this case the ET foam,
did not lead to a mishap, and thus was deemed acceptable up to fly.
Early in the Columbia accident investigation, the Manager of the Space Shuttle Program
brought a piece of ET foam roughly the same size as the one that hit the Columbia’s wing, to a
daily press briefing.161 He stated that foam shedding was a maintenance issue that they “were
comfortable with” and dismissed it as a potential cause of the accident.162 He was not the only
person at NASA who shared this opinion. We discussed the accident in my office area and no
one could believe that a piece of lightweight foam could pierce the tough Reinforced CarbonCarbon (RCC) material on the leading edge of the wing. Many of us were shocked when we
eventually saw the video of the “chicken gun” firing foam test pieces at a section of RCC and
seeing the resulting hole. Over time, NASA increased the size of the foam strikes deemed
acceptable and foam strikes over time were considered “in family.”163 NASA have moved
considerably from the original position of not permitting the shedding of debris from the Shuttle.
Diane Vaughan drew a parallel between the normalization deviance with respect to the field joint
issue that took Challenger, to the acceptance of ET foam shedding that ultimately caused
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Columbia’s demise.164 She asserted that the organizational issues that caused the Challenger
accident were not fixed and that both accidents were the result of many “interacting factors”
including political and economic environment, structure of the organization, and “layered
cultures that affected how people making technical decisions defined and redefined risk.”165 In
addition, having anomalies themselves was considered normal, which desensitized NASA to
issues that posed danger to the Shuttle and its crews.166 Although the examination of the NASA
organization itself was not part of the scope of this paper, it is clear that there was a direct
connection between the normalization of deviance observed and the organization and culture of
NASA.
An examination of the events that took place after launch and while Columbia was onorbit reveal some significant communications issues. A day after the launch, after looking at the
high-resolution footage of the ascent, the Inter Center Working Group discovered the foam strike
on the Orbiter.167 They requested that NASA contact the Department of Defense to gain imagery
of the Orbiter wing that they believed had been struck by the foam.168 A Debris Assessment
Team (DAT) was also formed to assess the potential damage to the wing and make
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recommendations.169 After the first imagery request was turned down by upper level Shuttle
management, the DAT began modeling of the potential damage with an analytical tool called
CRATER.170 Given that the model was not written to analyze the type of damage the team was
assessing, the team communication of the results was not one exuding confidence.171 After
hearing a summary of the results, the MMT concluded that the strike was not a safety issue, but
more of a refurbishment issue on the ground.172 Once again, less than optimal communication
through a presentation in a meeting impacted the decision making process.
Without communicating with the NASA DAT, a United Space Alliance Thermal
Protection System Subsystem Area Manager circulated an email that the Reinforced CarbonCarbon material on the leading edge of the Orbiter wing was “extremely resilient” to impact
damage and that the foam likely struck the RCC and “broke apart.”173 As discussed earlier, this
communication heavily influenced the Mission Management Team. In general, the discussion of
the potential damage was never discussed within the integrated Shuttle community, only within
certain isolated groups, a phenomenon known as communications silos.174 There seemed to be
no clear lines of communication between the engineers evaluating the potential damage and the
managers tasked with making safety decisions. As a result, two more requests for imagery
would be made and disapproved.175
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The CAIB determined that in addition to the three denied imagery requests, there were at
least eight missed opportunities over the course of a sixteen-day mission when the right action
could have led to the discovery of the damage on Columbia’s wing.176 The Columbia accident
was not directly caused by poor communication. However, poor communication prevented the
Shuttle team from properly assessing the damage to the wing. There were assumptions that
communication had taken place when it didn’t, discussions that were happening in isolated silos,
and the concerns of DAT that were not conveyed effectively to the Shuttle MMT decision
makers. After the accident, managers stressed that any engineer with a safety concern could
have voiced that concern to a manager.177 The CAIB pointed out that it was the managers’
responsibility to also seek out the technical opinions of the engineers and to ensure that the
engineers knew the communications paths available to them.178 Karl Weick concluded that the
complex bureaucratic structure impeded and even prevented communication between the
decision makers and the people who held the technical expertise.179
The discussion of communication ultimately leads one to ask the question, had the
Shuttle team discovered the significant damage to Columbia’s wing, could the crew have been
saved? Columbia was not in the same orbital inclination angle as the International Space Station
(ISS) and there was not enough propellant, even on a fully fueled Orbiter, to make an orbit
change needed to seek refuge on the ISS. The CAIB tasked NASA with investigating potential
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rescue scenarios to see if the crew could have been saved.180 NASA looked at a wing repair
scenario as well as an accelerated rescue mission with the Shuttle Atlantis.181 Both scenarios
were deemed risky but feasible.182 Unfortunately, due to poor communication, NASA did not
have the opportunity to explore either of these rescue options.

Conclusion
The space hardware did not perform as intended in the case of all three space accidents.
The failure of hardware can arise from problems with manufacturing and workmanship. Many
hardware failures are due to known or latent design issues. However, in the case of many
engineering accidents, human “failure” was as much a causal factor as design, manufacturing,
and workmanship issues. In the case of the three U.S. space program accidents there were three
key factors, cognitive bias, normalization of deviance, and most of all, communication
breakdown, that led to poor decision making which was a significant contribution to the three
U.S. space accidents. Cognitive bias played a role in all three accidents, although to varying
degrees. Anchoring bias was a significant factor that impacted the decision not to obtain
imagery of Columbia’s wing following the launch. All three accidents were impacted by
confirmation bias, where decision makers tended to accept the information that was consistent
with their opinions. All three accidents were heavily influenced by near-miss bias as evidenced
by the acceptance of flawed hardware since there had been no accidents involving that hardware
in the past. Normalization of deviance played a significant role in all three accidents. Known
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hardware issues and the resulting issues with performance, were dismissed as “normal” with
time. The greatest factor in all three accidents was flawed communication. The hardware and
data provided warnings that were ignored, dismissed, or intentionally not communicated.
Engineers communicated warnings verbally and by memo prior to all three accidents, yet the
warnings were not heeded.183 Communications issues resulted from poor chain of command
structure, inadequate presentation of data, suppression of dissenting opinions, and not having the
right personnel in a room. Had communication been better, all three of these accidents might
have been prevented. The Apollo Command Module would not have been accepted as-is, the
Challenger would not have launched, and flight controllers would have known that Columbia
had significant damage that put the astronauts in jeopardy. Some say that Columbia, once in
space, could not have been repaired to the point of saving the crew and vehicle. Unfortunately,
we will never know if an Apollo 13 style repair in space would have worked.
It has been mentioned that spacecraft and launch vehicles are extremely complicated
machines. We cannot always predict or prevent hardware failures because it is difficult to
anticipate every way that a complicated system will fail. However, we as engineers can take
responsibility for what we can control and that is the non-technical human factors that lead to
space accidents. As an engineer working in the field, I have learned that the moment you think
you are not biased, that is the moment when you are most vulnerable. Addressing cognitive bias
requires education and diligence to prevent, and complacency is an ever-present threat to that
diligence. After these three accidents, we should be more aware of the dangers of cognitive bias
and normalization of deviance, but there are still engineers who have not been exposed to
material discussing them. Vaughan stressed that the causes of both U.S. Shuttle accidents were
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both “patterned and systemic.”184 James Chiles made the point that the space vehicles can
become “prisoners of the many promises made to get them built, promises of safety, low cost,
on-time performance, and solid technology.”185 He also offered that the people involved with
disasters are often so focused on a goal, such as the Moon in a decade, that they become blind to
the warning signs around them.186 These statements resonated with me because of the many
pressures put on NASA, particularly political, funding, and schedule, that can make an already
difficult task all the more challenging, and saying “it can’t be done” is not an option. These
pressures seemed to set up, or at least re-enforce, the cognitive biases and normalization of
deviance observed in connection with all three accidents.
Engineers are often criticized for not being effective communicators, either in verbal or
written form. Although there are many exceptions, there is a great deal of truth in that
stereotype. Engineering curriculums must include so many technical courses, that it is a
challenge to fit liberal arts courses into a four-year program. Add cost, schedule, political, and
other pressures to the mix, then effective communication becomes even more of a challenge.
Something as simple as how data is presented to decision makers can have a tremendous impact.
Communication skills are something that can be acquired with diligent practice, and thus a factor
that engineers can control. We have learned from this study that communications or lack of it,
can make a significant difference in the outcome of a space mission. Although the agency, and
my company, are starting to require good communication skills from applicants, we still have a
long way to go in mitigating the risk posed by lack of communication. The missions will go on
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and so must we, keeping in mind that missions are not just the hardware, but the people who
design, test, build, and operate it.

Epilogue: The Soyuz I Accident
The United States was not the only nation to experience tragedy in its space program.
Russia, or at the time the Soviet Union, suffered two significant accidents resulting in the deaths
of one and three cosmonauts respectively. I chose to focus on the first one, the Soyuz I accident,
because it happened not long after the Apollo I fire. Two nations were locked in a Cold War
race to gain superiority in space and this rush to space came with a cost for both sides.
Ultimately, the Soyuz I would be the casualty of some of the same non-technical issues that
doomed Apollo I, including failed communication.
The challenge with researching and writing about the Soviet space program is the limited
number of sources. Most are secondary sources and much of what has been written about Soviet
space accidents came out after the end of the Cold War. The only primary sources I could locate
were ones from NASA personnel expressing sympathy following the accident. Even with
limited sources, one can see a glimpse of some of the issues that their programs experienced.
The Soyuz I launched, carrying Cosmonaut Vladamir Komarov, on April 23, 1967 from
Baikonur Cosmodrome in what is now modern-day Kazakhstan.187 This was the first launch of a
crewed Soyuz spacecraft.188 The original plan was to launch a second Soyuz in order to have a
rendezvous and docking of the two spacecraft in orbit as well as an extravehicular activity, or

187

Douglas Hart, The Encyclopedia of Soviet Spacecraft (New York: Exeter Books, 1987), 88.

188

Bryan Harvey, Soviet and Russian Lunar Exploration (New York: Springer Books, 2007), 130.

38
spacewalk.189 However, after launch a series of failures occurred. When Soyuz I reached orbit,
at least one of the solar panels, which provided power to the spacecraft did not deploy.190 The
lack of power caused the guidance system needed for navigation to not function properly.191
There were also issues with the spacecraft communications, propulsion, and thermal control
systems.192 The launch team considered launching the second Soyuz as a rescue mission but a
storm that passed over the launch complex caused problems with its electrical system.193 Given
the many technical issues with the first Soyuz, launching the second one would have been a high
risk operation, since the same technical issues could have happened to the second spacecraft.
The launch team decided to abort the mission and bring Soyuz 1 home.194 Even with a failed
navigation system, Komarov was able to pilot the Soyuz and achieve the correct alignment for
de-orbit.195 He was quoted as saying, “This devil ship, nothing I lay my hands on works
properly.”196 Komarov was able to successfully de-orbit and re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere but
unfortunately, the parachute for the capsule did not deploy properly and Komarov was killed on
impact when the Soyuz hit the ground at 400 miles per hour.197
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The Soyuz I accident happened approximately three months after the Apollo I fire. An
examination of the events leading to the launch reveal some haunting similarities between the
Apollo I and Soyuz 1 accidents. Both spacecraft were riddled with technical issues. There were
three failed tests of the Soyuz before Komarov’s launch, one ground failure and two failed uncrewed flight tests.198 According to Bryan Harvey, the consensus of the team was that the launch
was rushed before approximately 203 known technical issues with the Soyuz were fixed.199 Why
was there such a rush? According to Pier Bizony and Jamie Doran, political pressure was the
main cause.200 They asserted that Leonid Brezhnev wanted the two Soyuz spacecraft to dock on
May Day which on that year would have been the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian
Revolution.201 Unfortunately, the potential pressure to launch Apollo I and Soyuz I is difficult to
prove. However, given that these two nations were engaged in a space race with their perceived
national security and prestige at stake, political pressure was a strong possibility.
Was there evidence of cognitive bias, normalization of deviance, or communications issues
connected with the Soyuz accident? Without additional sources, it would be a challenge to
identify cognitive bias in connection with the accident. However, the team knew about 203
issues with the spacecraft and experienced three failed tests prior to the Soyuz flight, so it is
unlikely that they were subject to near-miss bias. While under pressure, they were willing to
accept and fly crewed hardware with known technical issues, so one could say that normalization
of deviance was present. The one issue that was absolutely present, according to the sources,
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was broken communication channels. The problems with the spacecraft were well known both
to the engineers and the cosmonauts. Komarov confided in a friend that he would not survive the
mission.202 When asked why he didn’t refuse to fly, he replied that his friend Yuri Gagarin
would be sent in his place and he wanted to protect Gagarin.203 Following that conversation, a
team of cosmonauts and engineers led by Gagarin compiled a memo describing all of the
problems with the Soyuz, with the hope of stopping the launch.204 The memo was taken to two
officials. The first refused to read it and the second attempted to bribe the messenger with a
promotion.205 The second official kept the memo and never passed it on Leonid Brezhnev,
whom he knew, because he knew his career would be ruined.206 This was a case where everyone
knew there was a problem but felt powerless to stop the launch. Even when an attempt was
made to elevate the problem to a higher authority, the engineers and cosmonauts were silenced.
Once again, non-technical factors impacted a space accident. Although it was difficult to
tell if cognitive bias was involved, there might have been some aspects of normalization of
deviance present when flawed hardware was accepted for crewed flight. Broken communication
was the most significant non-technical issue leading to the Soyuz 1 space accident. In this case,
many were afraid to speak up, and the ones who had the courage to come forward were abruptly
silenced. The Soyuz spacecraft had many technical issues that likely made it impossible to fly
successfully. There was pressure certainly pressure to launch the Soyuz 1 mission, just as there
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had been pressure to test and launch Apollo 1. In the case of both, properly functioning
communications channels would have prevented both accidents. The timing of the accidents
indicates that both sides were feeling pressure in the space race, and ironically, they both had
significant failures within three months of each other.
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